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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Robert Benjamin Brackett appeals from the district court’s order summarily dismissing
his post-conviction petition.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In its published opinion affirming Brackett’s judgment of conviction on direct appeal, the
Idaho Court of Appeals described the underlying facts and procedure as follows:
In January 2011, a minor reported to authorities that she had a sexual
relationship with forty-six-year-old Brackett. At the time of the relationship, the
minor was sixteen years old. Officers recovered a camera containing many
sexually explicit photos of the minor, which the minor claimed were taken by
Brackett and some of which depicted her having sexual contact with Brackett.
Brackett was charged with eight counts of possession of sexually exploitive
materials, I.C. § 18–1507A, and eight counts of sexual battery on a minor child of
sixteen or seventeen, I.C. § 18–1508A. Brackett’s first trial ended in a mistrial
after Brackett, during his opening statement, violated the district court’s pretrial
order. After his second trial, Brackett was found guilty by a jury of eight counts
of possession of sexually exploitive materials and five counts of sexual battery on
a minor child of sixteen or seventeen.
State v. Brackett, 160 Idaho 619, 624, 377 P.3d 1082, 1087 (Ct. App. 2016).
On direct appeal, Brackett asserted that the district court violated his speedy trial rights,
abused its discretion by declaring a mistrial in the first trial over his objection, erred in denying
his requests to access certain evidence, and erred by limiting his access to investigative
assistance. See id. at 624-635, 377 P.3d 1087-1098. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed
Bracket’s judgment of conviction. Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the
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district court’s denial of Brackett’s second and third motions for a new trial. 1 See State v.
Brackett, 2018 WL 2145658 * 1-4 (Idaho App. 2018) (unpublished).
In February 2017, Brackett filed a pro se post-conviction petition. (R., pp.8-42.)

He

also filed an amended post-conviction petition in which he raised additional claims. (R., pp.223260.) The district court appointed counsel to represent Brackett in the proceeding. (R., pp.112113.) However, Brackett later discharged counsel and chose to represent himself. (See R.,
pp.197-203, 211-212; Tr., p.3, L.6 – p.8, L.2.)
The district court entered a notice of intent to summarily dismiss Brackett’s petition. (R.,
pp.323-335.)

The court construed the petition as containing the following 25 claims: (1)

previously-appointed trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the charges filed in
Brackett’s original case (Twin Falls County Case CR-2011-00692) be dismissed with prejudice;
(2) previously-appointed trial counsel had a conflict of interest prior to withdrawing from the
case; (3) the attorney Brackett retained for the sentencing hearing was ineffective for failing to
adequately argue mitigation; (4) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise various
claims on direct appeal; (5) Brackett’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated in the course of
his arrest; (6) Brackett’s Fifth Amendment rights were violated as a result of the district court’s
process of randomly pre-seating the jury; (7) Brackett’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated
by the trial court permitting numerous counsel to withdraw from the case; (8) Brackett’s
1

Brackett did not appeal from the district court’s denial of his first motion for a new trial. See
Brackett, 2018 WL 2145658 at *1 (unpublished). Brackett’s appeal from the district court’s
denial of what appears to be his fourth motion for a new trial is currently pending. See State v.
Brackett, Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 45566.
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Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated based upon a trial issue related to an SD card; (9)
I.C. § 18-1508A is unconstitutional; (10) I.C.R. 48 is unconstitutional; (11) the state committed
various Brady2 violations; (12) the jury selection process violated Brackett’s due process rights;
(13) the prosecutor committed misconduct by failing to disclose an SD memory card; (14)
vindictive prosecution; (15) the district court committed error in instructing the jury; (16) the
district court erred in making various evidentiary rulings; (17) I.C.R. 16(m) is unconstitutional;
(18) Brackett’s rights to a speedy and fair trial were violated; (19) double jeopardy; (20)
prejudicial joinder; (21) the PSI was falsified; (22) the district court erred by failing to provide a
jury instruction on a lesser-included charge; (23) the district court failed to properly warn
Brackett of the dangers of self-representation; (24) the district court failed to inform Brackett of
“new laws” (I.C.R. 16(m) and I.C.R. 12.2); (25) the district court erred by failing to order an
evaluation to determine Brackett’s competence to stand trial. (R., pp.325-333.)
In the notice, the district court concluded that most of Brackett’s post-conviction claims
were forfeited pursuant to I.C. 19-4901(b) because they could have been raised on direct appeal,
or were already adjudicated on direct appeal. (R., pp.330-333.) The court also concluded that
Claim One was untimely because it related to a case that had been dismissed by stipulation of the
parties several years before charges were re-filed.

(R., pp.325-326.)

Finally, the court

concluded that Brackett failed to asserts facts which, if true, demonstrated he was entitled to
relief on Claims Two, Three, and Four. (R., pp.326-328.) The court informed Brackett that he
was entitled to reply within 20 days. (R., p.334.)
2

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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Brackett filed an “objection” to the district court’s notice of intent to dismiss. (R.,
pp.351-366.) Brackett also filed a premature notice of appeal. (R., pp.344-345.) The Idaho
Supreme Court suspended Brackett’s appeal until a final judgment was entered. (10/5/17 Order.)
The district court entered an order and judgment dismissing the petition on the grounds
previously set forth in its notice.

(R., pp.460-464.) The Idaho Supreme Court reinstated

Brackett’s appeal. (10/17/17 Order).
The district court appointed counsel to represent Brackett in his post-conviction appeal.
(R., pp.469-471.) However, the Idaho Supreme Court granted Brackett’s motion to discharge
counsel and proceed pro se. (1/11/18 Order.)
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ISSUE
Brackett’s issue statement is set forth at pages 12-14 of his Appellant’s brief, and, due to
its length, is not reproduced here.
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Brackett failed to demonstrate that the district court erred by summarily dismissing
his post-conviction petition?
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ARGUMENT
Brackett Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing His
Post-Conviction Petition
A.

Introduction
Brackett contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his post-

conviction petition. (See generally Appellant’s brief.) Brackett has failed to demonstrate that
the district court erred. A review of the record and Brackett’s appellate brief reveals that
Brackett has failed to assign any specific error to the district court, has failed to adequately
support his assertions with argument or authority, and has attempted to raise unpreserved issues
on appeal. In any event, the district court correctly dismissed Brackett’s petition.

B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary

hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists based on the
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file.” Workman v. State,
144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007).

C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That Brackett Failed To Make A Prima Facie
Showing For Post-Conviction Relief With Respect To Any Of His Claims
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure

Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent
civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled to
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relief. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662
P.2d 548, 550 (1983).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for postconviction relief, in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own initiative, if the applicant
“has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims
upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.” Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d
738, 739 (1998).

Until controverted by the state, allegations in a verified post-conviction

application are, for purposes of determining whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, deemed true.
Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). However, the court is not
required to accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible
evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110,
112 (2001); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994). Where the
district court summarily dismisses a post-conviction petition on its own initiative, a petitioner is
entitled to notice of the basis for the dismissal, and 20 days to respond. I.C. § 19-4906(b).
It is a well-settled tenet of appellate review that the “party alleging error has the burden
of showing it in the record.” Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc., 156 Idaho 37, 320 P.3d 428
(2014) (citation omitted). It is equally well-settled that the appellate court will not review
actions of the district court for which no error has been assigned and will not otherwise search
the record for unspecified errors. State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 159, 657 P.2d 17, 23
(1983). Moreover, “[a] party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument are
lacking.” State v. Freitas, 157 Idaho 257, 267, 335 P.3d 597, 607 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing State v.
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Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)). Finally, Idaho’s appellate courts “will
not consider issues not raised in the court below.” State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 833, 252
P.3d 563, 566 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 407, 825 P.2d 501, 504
(1992)).
Brackett’s Appellant’s brief, like his post-conviction petitions (see R., pp.8-42, 223-260),
are lengthy and somewhat difficult to decipher. Brackett spends the first portion of his brief
arguing the facts of the underlying case and raising complaints against the post-conviction
counsel who was originally appointed to his case. (Appellant’s brief, pp.1-11.)

Brackett then

largely recites several of the claims raised in his post-conviction petition without assigning
specific error to the district court. (Appellant’s brief, pp.12-26.)
For purposes of this appeal, the state adopts the manner in which the district construed
Bracket’s post-conviction claims. (See R., pp.325-333.) Brackett does not appear to argue that
the district court failed to address any of his claims in dismissing his petition, or that it
misconstrued any of his claims. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.12-26.) Thus, the state asserts all of
the claims potentially at issue before this Court are among those identified by the district court in
its notice of intent to dismiss and its dismissal order. Any claims that Brackett attempts to raise
on appeal that were not among those identified by the district court in either its notice of intent to
dismiss the petition, or in its dismissal order, are unpreserved, and may not be considered on
appeal. Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 322, 815 P.2d 1061, 1062 (1991) (explaining that,
generally, issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time on appeal). Further, to
the extent this Court construes Brackett’s petition as raising any claims or arguments differently
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than the state has, and chooses to address any of these claims, the state adopts the conclusions as
set forth in the district court’s notice of intent to summarily dismiss Brackett’s petition. (R.,
pp.323-335.) Finally, the state also notes that, while the district court took judicial notice of the
“file” associated with Brackett’s underlying criminal case (R., p.324), the Idaho Supreme Court
has not taken judicial notice of any records or transcripts compiled in the course of Brackett’s
direct appeal. On appeal, missing portions of the record are presumed to support the action of
the trial court. Rutter v. McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292, 293, 612 P.2d 135, 136 (1980).
1.

The District Court Properly Dismissed Brackett’s Claims That Were Forfeited
Pursuant To I.C. § 19-4901(b)

The remedy available under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act “is not a
substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the proceedings in the trial court, or of an
appeal from the sentence or conviction.” I.C. § 19-4901(b); accord Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho
720, 725, 932 P.2d 348, 353 (1997) (“An application for post-conviction relief is not a substitute
for an appeal.”). Thus, any “issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is
forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings” except upon a “substantial
factual showing” by admissible evidence “that the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial
doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence,
have been presented earlier.” I.C. § 19-4901(b) (emphasis added).
In this case, the district court properly recognized that most of Brackett’s post-conviction
claims were waived because they could have been raised on direct appeal and were not, or had
already been determined on direct appeal. (R., pp.330-333.) On appeal, Brackett appears to
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challenge the district court’s summary dismissal of some of these claims. Specifically, Brackett
references his claims that I.C. § 18-1508A is unconstitutional, that the state committed Brady
violations, that the district court committed various evidentiary errors during the trial, that the
state engaged in vindictive prosecution, that the jury selection process violated his due process
rights, and that the district court failed to adequately warn him of the dangers of selfrepresentation. (Appellant’s brief, pp.15-26.) However, Brackett has merely recited these claims
in the manner in which he raised them in his post-conviction petitions, and has wholly failed to
allege why these claims could not have been raised previously. Further, a review of these claims
reveals no reason why any of them could not have been raised previously. Brackett has therefore
failed to assign, let alone demonstrate, specific error to the district court, and has failed to
demonstrate that the district court erred in concluding that all of these claims were forfeited.
2.

The District Court Properly Dismissed Brackett’s Claim That His PreviouslyAppointed Trial Counsel Had A Conflict Of Interest

In his post-conviction petition, Brackett argued that Dan Brown, one of the attorneys
appointed to represent him prior to Brackett electing to represent himself in the underlying
criminal proceeding, had a conflict of interest based upon his previous representation of another
defendant who had been charged with a crime involving the same victim with whom Brackett was
accused of having a sexual relationship. (R., pp.11, 17-18.) Brackett further argued that, due to
this conflict, Brown sabotaged his defense in various ways, which “possibly impl[ied] some back
room dealing with the Gooding County prosecutor.” (R., pp.17-18.) The district court rejected
this claim. (R., pp.326-327.) In his Appellant’s brief, Brackett briefly recites the claim, but fails
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to assign any specific error to the district court. (Appellant’s brief, p.25.) Brackett has therefore
failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in summarily dismissing the claim. In any event,
a review of the record reveals that the district court properly concluded that Brackett failed to
demonstrate he was entitled to relief.
As the district court first correctly noted (R., p.327), it was not required to accept
Brackett’s unsubstantiated and conclusory allegations regarding “back room dealing[s]” in his
case. See Ferrier, 135 Idaho at 799, 25 P.3d at 112; Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901.
Further, as the district court observed (id.), Brackett ultimately represented himself at both jury
trials, and overall, between at least February 2012 and his second jury trial almost a year later in
January 2013. 3 Thus, Brackett had ample time to secure any of the unspecified evidence and/or
witnesses that he alleges Brown failed to obtain for him. (Id.) Brackett has cited no support for
his proposition, set forth in his Appellant’s brief, that a defense attorney’s conflict of interest
results in presumed prejudice against the defendant, even after the attorney with the conflict
withdraws from the case. This argument is therefore waived. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d
at 970.

Brackett has thus failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in summarily

dismissing this claim.

3

Brackett’s first five court-appointed attorneys all withdrew from Brackett’s representation
between January 2011 and October 2011. See Brackett, 160 Idaho at 626, 377 P.3d at 1089.
The first three of these attorneys withdrew due to conflicts of interest, and the next two attorneys
withdrew as a result of Brackett’s uncooperative behavior. See id. Brackett chose to discharge
his sixth court-appointed counsel and to represent himself on the day scheduled for Brackett’s
original trial. Id. at 626-627, 377 P.3d at 1089-1090.
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3.

The District Court Properly Dismissed Brackett’s Claim That The Counsel He
Retained For Sentencing Was Ineffective

In his post-conviction petition, Brackett argued that the counsel he retained for the
sentencing hearing inadequately argued mitigation. (R., pp.11, 18-19.) The district court rejected
this claim. (R., pp.327-328.) In his Appellant’s brief, Brackett simply recites the claim and fails
to assign any specific error to the district court. (Appellant’s brief, p.25.) Brackett has therefore
failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in summarily dismissing the claim. In any event,
a review of the record and relevant caselaw reveals that the district court properly concluded that
Brackett failed to demonstrate he was entitled to relief.
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate
both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). Bare
assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not make out a prima facie case for
ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903.
An attorney’s performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct is
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631,
634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct.
App. 1989). “[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable ….” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. To establish
prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient
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performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114
Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d
241, 245 (Ct. App. 1999).
On appeal and in his post-conviction petition, Brackett contends that the counsel he
retained for the sentencing hearing should have: (1) presented evidence that the victim utilized a
fake identification to enter bars and drink alcohol; (2) presented evidence that the state offered a
plea offer prior to trial, pursuant to which Brackett would have only served eight years in prison;
(3) presented a photograph of the victim and another individual engaged in a sexually suggestive
posture in a motel room bed; and (4) presented a telephone recording between the victim and her
sister. (Appellant’s brief, p.25; R., pp.11, 18-19.)
The district court correctly rejected this claim. (R., pp.327-328.) As the court concluded
after reviewing the relevant sentencing transcript, it was clearly a strategic decision for counsel
not to attempt to shed a negative light on the victim in arguing for a more lenient sentence in this
case. (R., p.327 (“The Court fails to see how the circumstances argued by the Petitioner are
mitigating for purposes of sentencing given the nature of the underlying offenses.”).) Brackett
has not argued that his counsel’s sentencing argument was based upon some objective
shortcoming or was based upon anything other than strategy. As the court also concluded (R.,
pp.327-328), Brackett failed to attempt to demonstrate that his sentence would have been
different had his counsel framed his argument the way Brackett now contends he should have.
Brackett has therefore failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in summarily dismissing
this claim.
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4.

The District Court Properly Dismissed Brackett’s Claim That His Appellate
Counsel Was Ineffective

In his post-conviction petition, Brackett argued that his appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to raise certain issues on direct appeal. (R., pp.12, 19-21.) The district court rejected
this claim. (R., pp.328-329.) In his Appellant’s brief, Brackett simply recites the claim and fails
to assign any specific error to the district court. (Appellant’s brief, pp.24-25.) Brackett has
therefore failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in summarily dismissing this claim. In
any event, a review of the record and relevant caselaw reveals that the district court properly
concluded that Brackett failed to demonstrate he was entitled to relief.
The two-prong Strickland test for ineffective assistance of trial counsel also applies to
claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 243 P.3d
675 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 661, 168 P.3d 40, 45 (Ct. App.
2007)). In order to establish ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a petitioner has the
burden of proving that his counsel’s representation on appeal was deficient and that the
deficiency was prejudicial. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho
274, 276, 971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998). Even if a defendant requests that certain issues be raised on
appeal, appellate counsel has no constitutional obligation to raise every non-frivolous issue
requested by the defendant. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-53 (1983); Aragon v. State, 114
Idaho 758, 765, 760 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1988) (citing Jones, 463 U.S. at 751-754). As explained
by the United States Supreme Court, “[e]xperienced advocates since time beyond memory have
emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one
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central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues.” Jones, 463 U.S. at 752. The relevant
inquiry is whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the defendant
would have prevailed on appeal. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000); Schoger v. State,
148 Idaho 622, 629, 226 P.3d 1269, 1276 (2010) (citing State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199
P.3d 123, 136 (2008)).
In his Appellant’s brief, Brackett identifies two direct appellate claims that he asserts his
appellate counsel should have raised: (1) that I.C. § 18-1508A is unconstitutional; and (2)
“erroneous jury instruction.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.24-25.) However, as was the case in his
post-conviction petition (see R., pp.12, 19-21), Brackett has wholly failed to argue that these
claims were meritorious as viewed individually, or that they were more meritorious than any of
the claims that direct appellate counsel actually chose to raise (see Appellant’s brief, pp.24-25).
This is fatal to his claim. In fact, it is not even clear from Brackett’s Appellant’s brief, or his
post-conviction petition, to which “jury instruction” he refers. Brackett has also failed to attempt
to identify any objective shortcoming in his appellate counsel’s decision not to raise these
claims.

A review of the Idaho Court of Appeals’ published opinion affirming Brackett’s

convictions on direct appeal reveals that appellate counsel raised numerous non-frivolous claims,
including one for which the Court of Appeals found trial court error, albeit harmless error.
Brackett, 160 Idaho at 624-635, 377 P.3d at 1087-1098. Therefore, Brackett has failed to
demonstrate that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel claim.
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5.

The District Court Did Not Err In Declining To Conduct A Previously-Scheduled
Evidentiary Hearing

Brackett raises two other issues related to the district court’s decision to summarily
dismiss his post-conviction petition. First, Brackett contends that the district court erred in
summarily dismissing his petition when the court had already scheduled an evidentiary hearing.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.17-18.) Next, Brackett contends that the district court erred by taking
judicial notice of records from the underlying criminal case and then summarily dismissing his
petition, because, Brackett asserts, the very act of taking judicial notice creates an issue of
material fact in a post-conviction proceeding. (Appellant’s brief, p.18.) Brackett has failed to
show that the district court erred in either respect.
In October 2017, Brackett filed a written objection in which he alleged that the district
court summarily dismissed his petition and canceled a scheduled evidentiary hearing in
“retaliation” for Brackett choosing to represent himself in the proceeding. (R., pp.351-366.)
However, in its order summarily dismissing Brackett’s petition on the grounds previously set
forth in its notice of intent to dismiss, the court explained that it dismissed the petition simply
because Brackett’s claims lacked merit. (R., pp.460-461.) Earlier in the proceeding, prior to the
summary dismissal of Brackett’s petition, the district court entered a scheduling order which
included dates for a potential “pretrial” hearing and evidentiary hearing.

(R, pp.158-161.)

However, the court expressly recognized that the case could still be “resolved by a motion for
summary disposition or pursuant to a notice of intent to dismiss issued by the court,” and that the
scheduling of the hearings would merely “permit expeditious resolution of this matter in the
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event this matter is not resolved by agreement or motion.” (R., p.160 (emphasis added).)
Brackett has cited no authority for his apparent proposition that once a district court reserves a
date for a potential evidentiary hearing in a post-conviction proceeding, the court must conduct
the hearing regardless of the merits of the petitioner’s claims. This argument is therefore
waived, in addition to lacking merit. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970.
Brackett has also failed to support, with authority, his apparent assertion that a district
court’s decision to take judicial notice of records from the underlying case precludes that court
from summarily dismissing the petition. This argument is also therefore waived. Id. It also
lacks merit. As noted above, I.C. § 19-4906 authorizes the summary dismissal of an application
for post-conviction relief, in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own initiative, if the
applicant “has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of
the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.” Berg, 131 Idaho at 518, 960
P.2d at 739. A post-conviction petitioner cannot defeat a meritorious motion for summary
dismissal or notice of intent to dismiss entered on the court’s own initiative simply by moving
successfully for the court to take judicial notice of underlying criminal records. Brackett has
thus failed to demonstrate that the district court erred.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order summarily
dismissing Brackett’s petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 18th day of June, 2018.
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